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RESUMÉ 
Det centrale spørgsmål, der vil blive behandlet i denne artikel, er, hvorvidt det 
er muligt at skabe politiske fællesskaber på baggrund af en postmoderne, anti-
essentialistisk ontologi. Den postmoderne kritik af essentialisme gør kategorier 
så som kategorien ’kvinde’ dybt mistænkelige, men uden sådanne mobili-
serende kategorier er kampen for ligestilling for kvinder vanskelig eller sågar 
umulig. Jeg analyserer Iris Marion Youngs forsøg på at løse essentialismepro-
blemet ved hjælp af en teori om fællesskab som serialitet. Jeg konkluderer, at 
Youngs teori kun formår at fremstille en forskydning af essentialisme-
problemet i stedet for en reel løsning på det.   
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The central question that will be investigated in this article is whether or not it 
is possible to establish political collectives based on a postmodern, anti-
essentialist ontology. The postmodern critique of essentialism makes categories 
such as ‘woman’ inherently suspicious, but without such mobilizing categories 
the fight for equality for women is difficult if not impossible. I will analyze Iris 
Marion Young’s attempt to solve the problem of essentialism through a theory 
of the collective as seriality. My conclusion is that Young only manages to 
dislocate the problem of essentialism instead of providing a real solution to it.      
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Introduction 
Most people know the frustration of being perceived as something they are not. 
To be victim of a generalization on account of a physical trait or a way of 
behaving. One might be expected to act in a certain way or like certain things 
because of one’s attachment to a specific social group. Many people even build 
their personality around trying to stand out from the group they are assumed 
to belong to in an attempt to be ‘truly themselves’. This problem becomes all 
the more apparent when the social group to which one belongs is a socially 
suppressed or discriminated group. Then the need to stand out and prove that 
you are not like ‘them’ might be even more pressing. One might even hear it as 
a compliment, when someone says that ‘you are not like other girls.’ But why 
is this seen as a compliment? Because belonging to a group always entails some 
level of abstraction from who one is as an individual. Being seen as different 
can be empowering and give one a sense of self. At the same time, belonging 
to a group is necessary to build a sense of identity and establish one’s place in 
the world. All people see themselves as being defined by categories, like 
nationality, profession, sexuality, age, gender, etc. These categories define who 
we are, but at the same time, they both surpass and limit our individuality. 
For a collective of people to be able to engage in political action, they need to 
establish themselves as a group or a social collective with common goals and 
some form of group identity. And if the purpose of the political action is to fight 
for recognition and equality or against oppression on account of a common 
characteristic or quality shared by the group, then this need becomes even 
stronger. The problem of defining the feature or features that are supposedly 
shared by all women has been at the center of feminist discussions from the 
start but has taken a particularly productive turn in the last few decades. The 
debate can be understood as taking place between two opposed philosophical 
extremes, essentialism and anti-essentialism, sometimes known as social 
constructivism. The different advocates for the two standpoints both present 
strong and convincing arguments, which suggests that the (practical and 
theoretical) solution is to be found in a position that preserves the best of both 
extremes, without falling victim to the critique presented by either side. But is 
such a position conceivable? Post-structuralist thinker Iris Marion Young (1995) 
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presents a theory of the social collective that is supposed to be able to overcome 
the problems of essentialism and exclusion without abandoning the possibility 
for group action.  
In this article, I will present the notion of essentialism in the context of feminist 
political theory and show how the notion of a ‘female essence’ is politically 
problematic. I will then go on to discuss a possible solution to the problem of 
essentialism, namely Iris Marion Young’s concept of seriality. Finally, I will 
criticize this theory by arguing that it fails to solve the problem of essentialism 
properly, instead merely placing the problem in a different sphere. 
 
The problem of essentialism  
Postmodernism is a term that covers a lot of different thinkers and theoretical 
traditions, but one thing that almost all postmodern thinkers have in common 
is the critique of the idea of a unitary subject possessing an essence that persists 
over time. This criticism then translates into a skepticism against any kind of 
social or political group founded on such a notion, as for instance the women’s 
movement. But why is it a problem to think of women as possessing some kind 
of female essence and deriving their political interests from what is essentially 
feminine?  
First it is necessary to clarify what essentialism means and what its political 
implications are. Gendered essentialism is, in short, the postulation of a fixed 
essence which is common to all women. Diana Fuss (1990) describes 
essentialism as “located in appeals to a pure or original femininity, a female 
essence, outside the boundaries of the social and thereby untainted” (2). She 
then connects the idea of an ontological female essence to the political group-
defining essentialism that is central to feminist politics. She writes: Essentialism 
“can also be read in the accounts of universal female oppression, the 
assumption of a totalizing symbolic system which subjugates all women 
everywhere, throughout history and across cultures” (2). The female essence is 
thought to transcend culture and time and is always inscribed in a system of 
gendered oppression. Such essentialist assumptions are often connected to 
ideas about biology and followed by a line of preconceptions about 
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temperament, physical appearance and psychological traits, such as empathy, 
patience, nurturance, etc.  
In modern feminist theory, essentialism is mostly seen as a problem or an 
obstacle to overcome, though some feminist thinkers do defend the position 
that women possess a specifically female essence. This is mostly characteristic 
of the so-called second wave feminists and the French feminist tradition, which 
stresses the difference between men and women instead of mainly focusing on 
equality. Robin Morgan, editor of the first anthology of feminist writings 
Sisterhood is Powerful (1970) followed by Sisterhood is Global (1984) and Sisterhood 
is Forever (2003), is a strong defender of such an essentialist view of women and 
women’s issues. In the foreword to Sisterhood is Global, she claims that women 
are inherently more peaceful, more skeptical toward technological advances 
and more politically impartial than men (Mohanty 1995, 73). From these 
characteristics, she argues that women would be better political leaders than 
men and should therefore have more influence in politics. This is an argument 
built on the assumption of a female essence.  
An essentialist approach to feminist theory does have some advantages but 
leads to several problems. Among the advantages is its ability to create a social 
collective that is easy to mobilize, assuming that people feel that they can relate 
to the attributes that are said to be typically female. Essentialism can thereby 
be very empowering and help suppressed groups claim their own identity, 
sometimes even stretching so far as to reclaim oppressive and sexist terms, as 
is the case with the so-called ‘SlutWalk’ movement. Showing how women may 
be different from men also helps to reveal how a lot of things are already 
gendered but from a male perspective. By asserting a female essence, it can 
become possible to create an alternative to the male perspective that presents a 
more accurate representation of female experience.  
On the other hand, an essentialist feminist theory causes a lot of problems. One 
problem is the reinforcement of gender stereotypes. Claiming some quality or 
another to be typically feminine mostly reproduces and generalizes 
misconceptions about women and are often directly sexist. An example is the 
stereotype that women are more nurturing and caring than men which roughly 
translates into the assumption that women should be the principle caregivers 
and if possible stay-at-home mothers. A second problem concerning essen-
tialism is that it is often founded on a blind generalization of the experiences of 
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women from privileged backgrounds (Grillo 2013, 19). This can be explained 
as being caused by an attempt to isolate the ‘gender’-part of oppression by 
subtracting forms of oppression referring to race, sexuality or social 
background. The result is that the “neutral” female experience becomes that of 
white, heterosexual woman from the Global North because they are perceived 
as being “without race” rather than as white (19).1 Thirdly, essentialism can 
lead to the exclusion of women who for some reason do not possess the 
qualities belonging to the essentialized category ‘woman’. This is particularly 
clear in the case of transgender-women who are often left out of feminist 
struggle because they are believed to lack certain female traits or because they 
might express gender in a non-binary fashion. Transfeminism is anti-
essentialist in the sense that it maintains that “those who do not fit neatly into 
one sex/gender/gender expression category or another can still feel as though 
they belong inside a gender identity and expression continuum that is not 
confined within the binary” (Sennott 2011, 103). 
In the history of philosophy, essentialism has been contested from various 
sides. Chantal Mouffe (2005, 75-77) mentions three central philosophical 
traditions that are all anti-essentialist and have in different ways inspired 
postmodern thinkers, namely the Freudian psychoanalysis, philosophy of 
language following Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. 
Existentialism is another philosophical tradition that could be added to the mix. 
In Existentialism is a humanism (2007), Jean-Paul Sartre writes that “existence 
precedes essence” (20), which, in short, means that first people exist and then 
they create and define their essence through their actions. All of these theories 
of the subject and its place in the world determines identity as constructed, 
socially positioned, internally conflicted, fluid and to some extent unknown to 
us. This is the philosophical foundation of most postmodern political thinkers. 
But what does this mean for the construction of social categories and groups?  
Groups founded on shared identities, such as the Black Panthers, Femen, 
RAWA,2 etc. are all organized around identifying characteristics (race, gender, 
nationality) but only around parts of people’s identities. The Combahee River 
 
1 An example of this criticism can be found in the feminist classic Ain’t I a Woman (1981) by bell 
hooks.  
2 Abbreviation for the Revolutionary Association of Women in Afghanistan. 
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Collective, a black feminist, lesbian group from Boston (1974-1980) were united 
because they did not feel represented in either the black civil rights movement 
or the women’s movement. They felt they needed a group that represented 
more sides of their identities. All identities belong to several categories and in 
every group there will be conflict on account of the non-represented sides of 
the member’s identities. In the case of the Black Panther Party, the experiences 
of the women in the party were different from that of the men, causing internal 
division and disunity.  
So considering these problems of essentialism, it seems that the most rational 
thing would be to abandon any attempt to unify people under social categories 
because no social category or group seems to be able to properly represent all 
the interests of its members. But discarding the term ‘woman’ as a social 
category also entails a lot of problems, as mentioned above. Iris Marion Young 
recognizes this as the dilemma of feminist politics. In her article Gender as 
Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective, she expresses the dilemma 
thus: 
On the one hand, without some sense in which ‘woman’ is the name 
of a social collective, there is nothing specific to feminist politics. On 
the other hand, any effort to identify the attributes of that collective 
appears to undermine feminist politics by leaving out some women 
whom feminists ought to include. (188) 
If women can in no way be thought of as a social collective, then feminist 
politics seems to have no subject. This means that they cannot claim to fight for 
the interests of anyone and thus become powerless. However, any attempt to 
define the political subject of feminist politics appears to force one into making 
a list of attributes that characterize women which entails asserting that women 
possess a certain essence. Is there no getting rid of this dilemma? Is feminist 
politics inherently essentialist?  
 
A postmodern approach to group identity 
Classic identity politics seem to be weakened by the problem of essentialism. 
The postmodern feminist tradition, which is built on the writings of post-
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structural and deconstructionist thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Derrida, has more than any other tradition been the focal point of this criticism. 
But is it possible to establish a new theory of the collective and still stay true to 
this fluid and anti-hegemonic way of thinking and criticizing? A handful of 
feminist thinkers have tried. In the following, I will present what I perceive to 
be one of the most promising and interesting attempts to develop an anti-
essential theory of social collectives, namely the theory of seriality developed 
by Young. 
 
Gender as seriality  
Young insists that it is crucial for feminist political action to be able to establish 
some sort of political collective under the name ‘women’, but proposes a very 
different way of thinking about collectives than what we are used to. She draws 
her inspiration from Sartre and his description of what he calls ‘seriality’, which 
is found in the Critique of Dialectical Reason from 1976. Sartre originally used the 
term to explain what was unifying the working class as a social collective even 
though the working class consisted of so many different people and social 
groups. However, Young finds that the concept is helpful in thinking about 
women as well. She writes: “Such a way of thinking about women, I will argue, 
allows us to see women as a collective without identifying common attributes 
that all women have or implying that all women have a common identity” 
(1995, 188). Young sees the concept of seriality as a way to escape the essen-
tialism of identity politics without abandoning social collectives altogether. But 
first she identifies the specific points of anti-essentialist thinkers that will have 
to be considered in the reconceptualization of the social collective. 
 
Three problems when thinking about women as a social collective 
Young starts off her argument for the anti-essentialist rethinking of social 
groups with a series of statements that aim to leave any notion of a general 
category of women behind. The purpose of this list is to show the features that 
will have to be compatible with a new theory of the social collective and the 
problems which such a theory will have to overcome. The first statement on the 
      /  Anne-Sophie Sørup Nielsen    ISSN: 2245-9855 
 
 
Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling Årg. 8, nr. 1 (2020) 
Journal of Media, Cognition and Communication Vol. 8, no. 1 (2020) 
33
list is championed by Elizabeth Spelman who points to “the mistake in any 
attempt to isolate gender from identities, such as race, class, age, sexuality, and 
ethnicity to uncover the attributes, experiences, or oppressions that women 
have in common” (Young 1995, 188). It is, according to both Spelman and 
Young, impossible to distinguish the “women part” of any identity, because 
other identity-building categories influence and meddle with the experience of 
being a woman. The position that Spelman takes is that “the categories 
according to which people are identified as the same or different […] are social 
constructs that reflect no natures or essences” (189). But how are these 
categories constructed? The answer is: by power relations of privilege and 
subordination. Because of their privileged position, white middle-class women 
have had a monopoly on defining ‘women’ as a group and on describing the 
misogyny that this group experiences. The experiences of less privileged and 
suppressed groups of women (such as black, elderly or Muslim women) is thus 
thought of as ‘different’ from the norm and, therefore, not relevant in a struggle 
focusing specifically on feminist issues (189).  
The second feminist scholar to be mentioned is Chandra Talpade Mohanty. The 
point that Young extracts from the writings of Mohanty is how the notion of a 
single, congruent category of ‘women’ tends to “regard all women as equally 
powerless and oppressed victims” (1995, 189). Instead of empirically 
investigating the conditions of women worldwide, questioning exactly why 
these women suffer and how, theories and studies tend to be underdetermined 
“finding oppression a priori” (189). This is especially damaging to the women 
in the Global South, whose struggles for emancipation are overlooked and 
misunderstood because their cultural backgrounds are misinterpreted, their 
goals and desires supposedly being the same as those of women in the Global 
North.  
Judith Butler is the last representative of the new theoretic foundation being 
developed in this text. Butler’s writings draw explicitly on postmodern 
thought, deconstructivism in particular, to conceptually and ontologically 
unfold the gender-category, discursively as well as biologically. She argues that 
“the idea of gender identity and the attempt to describe it has a normalizing 
power” (190). This power consists of two elements: it devalues and alienates 
some gender identities by posing others as normal and therefore morally 
superior; at the same time, normalization hides the constructive character of 
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gender identity, presuming that some genders are ‘natural’. This normalization 
happens in a heterosexual discourse, which is sharply criticized by Butler. This 
means that the notion of gender mirrors the idea of a biological sex, separating 
the gender spectrum into two. Any unity of experience that would provide the 
foundation for a feminist politics would, according to Butler, necessitate the 
confirmation of heteronormativity. The challenge that feminist theory takes up 
is to expose the historical and scientific construction of gender and consistently 
fight to keep this category open and fluid (190). 
To summarize, the points that have been listed as starting points and problems 
concerning the construction of a feminist collective are as follows: 1) Categories 
are social constructs created as a means of exerting power over certain groups 
in society that are perceived to be ‘different’, 2) women are victimized and 
misinterpreted through the idea of a collective identity, and 3) the socially 
constructed category ‘woman’ has a normalizing effect which forces human 
beings into a conceptual structure where gender is defined by a heterosexual 
notion of a biological sex.  
These are some of the main problems facing any theory of a social collective 
built on the concept of ‘women’. The critical content of these theories is 
convincing and worth taking on board, but should this discourage women and 
other suppressed groups from taking political action and fighting for their 
rights? Young writes:  
These analyses are powerful and accurate. They identify ways that 
essentializing assumptions and the point of view of privileged 
women dominate much feminist discourse, even when it tries to 
avoid such hegemonic moves. […] But I find the exclusively critical 
orientation of such arguments rather paralyzing. Do these 
arguments imply that it makes no sense and is morally wrong ever 
to talk about women as a group or, in fact, to talk about social groups 
at all? It is not clear that these writers claim this. If not, then what 
can it mean to use the term woman? (191) 
Young argues that it is necessary to look at the positive outcomes and insights 
that have arisen from these seemingly purely critical theories and, with the 
awareness of this critical tradition, build a postmodern theory of the collective. 
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The theory of seriality 
Young’s theory of the social collective is, as already mentioned, founded on 
Sartre’s analysis of the social phenomenon called ‘series’ (197). But what should 
be understood by seriality and how does Young apply this theory to feminist 
politics? First, it is important to understand the distinction between seriality 
and the notion of a group. Young defines a group thus: “A group is a collection 
of persons who recognize themselves and one another as in a unified relation 
with one another” (197). This means that being in a group relies on an element 
of self-identification and is a conscious choice. One only belongs to groups that 
one is aware of and of which one would consider oneself to be a member. Being 
a member means to “mutually acknowledge that together they undertake a 
common project. Members of the group, that is, are united by action that they 
undertake together” (198). The group is, according to Young, always focused 
on some common practical goal, which can be expressed in a statement, 
contract or pledge. Many of the actions performed in an individual’s life are 
made possible by groups and achieved by groups, but people are not always 
active in one or more groups, as “groups arise from and often fall back into a 
less organized and unselfconscious collective unity, which [Sartre] calls a 
series” (199). 
This means that a series is not built on a mutual understanding of a common 
purpose; the individuals in the series might not even be consciously aware of 
the meaning of their collective. But what then does positively define the series? 
According to Young:  
[A] series is a social collective whose members are unified passively 
by the objects around which their actions are oriented […] In 
everyday life we often experience ourselves and others impersonally, 
as participating in amorphous collectives defined by routine 
practices and habits. (199) 
The series is materially defined by the coincidental sameness of individual 
needs, schedules, customs and choices. This is best exemplified by the bus 
example posited by Sartre. Waiting for a bus is a version of a series. The people 
waiting have a material object (the bus) in common, and they all follow the 
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‘rules’ of waiting for the bus. They might even relate to each other in this 
situation, noticing that an elderly citizen might need help getting on the bus or 
another member of the series might have questions about the route of the bus. 
All interaction in one way or another pertains to the material circumstances of 
waiting for a bus. This does not, however, define them as human beings: “Their 
actions and goals may be different, and they have nothing necessarily in 
common in their histories, experiences, or identity” (199). Some might ride the 
bus because of financial reasons (they might not be able to afford a car), some 
for political reasons (they might support public transport) and some for 
circumstantial reasons (their car might have broken down this morning), which 
means that the series can consist of people of various classes, genders, 
ethnicities, etc., but in this case they are all coming together in waiting for the 
bus. In the event that a material problem arises, they may transform into a 
group: “The latent potential of this series to organize itself as a group will 
become manifest, however, if the bus fails to come” (199). The material problem 
might encourage them to act as a group by e.g. calling the bus company or 
maybe sharing a taxi. This discontent might possibly motivate broader political 
action in the form of a movement, were the problem severe enough. The main 
point of the series is that the individual is a part of this collective, not on account 
of what makes them particular, but because of what they have in common or 
what makes them anonymous. Sartre describes this as seeing oneself as an 
‘Other’ (201). People in the series are interchangeable (in their function as 
passengers on a bus) though not identical:  
Membership in a serial collective defines an individual’s being, in a 
sense – one “is” a farmer, or a commuter, or a radio listener, and so 
on, together in series with other similarly positioned. But the defini-
tion is anonymous, and the unity of the series is amorphous, without 
determinate limits, attributes, or intentions. (Young 1995, 201) 
The concept of seriality aims at defining these impersonal collectives, which 
have no solid borders, defining who is “in and out” on account of some 
necessary characteristic or trait common to the members of the collective. The 
collective, nonetheless, plays a role in creating our practical and material 
everyday life. It is not important in this context how often one takes the bus or 
how well you know the timetable of the bus, only that the bus is a material 
object which brings people together. In short, a series is an impersonal, 
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contingent connection between a collective of people gathered around a 
material object, each with their own agendas and identities, and each 
perceiving each other and themselves as an anonymous ‘Other’. 
 
What are the advantages of thinking of women as a social series? 
Now, one might ask: But what does this have to do with women? How does 
seriality work to describe women as a collective? And how does this notion of 
seriality avoid the problems and criticisms posed above by Spelman, Mohanty 
and Butler? Sartre uses the concept of seriality to analyze the meaning of social 
classes. This allows him to describe a side of class reality that is different from 
class consciousness, namely class as the “historical and materialized back-
ground to individual lives” (202). Being born into a class means being born with 
a certain context: a set of power relations which precede the individual and 
which condition and constrain their options for action. Seriality explains the 
environment or milieu that “serves as a prereflective background to action” 
(203). It concerns the structural backdrop of different lives, which is mostly 
taken for granted. The same is true of gender, when Young uses seriality to 
identify how women can theoretically be seen as a collective. Young writes: 
“Women are the individuals who are positioned as feminine by the activities 
surrounding those structures and objects” (203). But what kind of material 
objects construct the female series?  
The “structures and objects” that Young considers define the series that women 
belong to are for instance: 1) the female body and objects associated with it, 2) 
pronouns, 3) some artifacts, such as clothes and cosmetics 4) and, to some 
degree, public spaces (the women’s bathroom, women-only mosques, all-girls 
schools, etc.) (203-5). These structures and objects are, as already mentioned, 
not thought of as identity-creating features, but rather as the backdrop and the 
props that signify gender in a given society. I will briefly look more closely at 
the gendered objects listed above. Most prominent perhaps is the notion of 
some sort of common experience tied to the female body because this seems to 
be exactly the kind of biological essentialism that has been criticized by Butler. 
However, Young does not argue that the physical, biological body in itself 
constitutes the series to which women belong but rather the female body as a 
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rule-bound object “with understood meanings and possibilities” (204). She 
mentions menstruation as an example of a process that is not only biological, 
but also associated with social rules and material objects thereby defining a part 
of the living space within which women live and act. Even though no woman 
is defined by needing tampons, this is an object that serializes women to some 
degree. The need for hygiene products has also historically led women to unite 
in groups fighting for the removal of taxation from these products or for free 
and universal access to feminine hygiene products. It is important to stress that 
menstruation is not being ascribed as an attribute to womanhood or a necessary 
condition thereof, but as one open series among many that women take part in3 
This is especially important when we consider the possibility of transwomen’s 
participation in feminist struggles. Every struggle is different and is dependent 
on the specific material circumstances and structures that unite the particular 
series. The structure that characterizes this particular series is heterosexuality, 
meaning the binary separation of people into male and female as well as some 
biological characteristics that are often associated with heterosexuality. Young 
writes: “The structure of the social body defining these bodily practices, 
however, is enforced heterosexuality. The meanings, rules, practices, and 
assumptions of institutionalized heterosexuality constitute the series, women, 
as in a relation of potential appropriation by men” (204). This structure is 
enforced by other items on the list, such as (2) pronouns that divide people into 
‘he’ and ‘she’, and (3) gendered artifacts, such as dresses and high heels. These 
were some examples of how the concept of seriality can be used to talk about 
women as a social collective. The collective is founded not on what makes 
people who they are, but on one anonymous category that shapes and limits 
their life. Young writes that to say: 
’I am a woman’ at this level is an anonymous fact that does not 
define me in my active individuality. It means that I check one box 
rather than another on my driver’s license application, that I use 
maxipads, wear pumps […]. As I utter the phrase, I experience a 
 
3 Another theory that poses a similar open solution to the problem of essentialized groups is 
the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘family resemblance’ as a foundation for the formation of social 
collectives. This theory has also been applied by feminist thinkers. For more on this see 
Chantal Mouffe (2005, 78) and Linda Nicholson (1995, 60).  
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serial interchangeability between myself and others. (206) 
This interchangeability is, according to Young, what makes it possible to put 
oneself in someone else’s shoes and maybe even fight for rights that one does 
not directly benefit from. Any social category describes an anonymous part of 
one’s personality that one shares with the rest of the group but that, at the same 
time, is an intimate part of oneself.  
Now the question arises as to whether the idea of seriality is capable of 
avoiding the problems posed by the afore-mentioned anti-essentialists. First off 
is Elizabeth Spelman. Young agrees with Spelman in thinking that categories 
are both constructed and a means of power, but rather than therefore 
abandoning any categorical thinking whatsoever, Young treats this as a 
condition of life. Human beings live within structures and these structures or 
series are sometimes suppressive, but they allow us to relate to one another and 
also to organize and fight against unfairness in society. When it comes to the 
point that Spelman makes, namely that it is impossible to separate the ‘women-
part’ of human experience, Young seems to change the focus of the discussion. 
Instead of trying to define which part of one’s identity is primarily female (as 
opposed to, for example, Jewish, Latino or working-class), she asks which 
practices and objects dictate one’s everyday life and how they are inherently 
gendered. I will discuss in the next section whether or not this poses a solution 
to the problem of essentialism or merely displaces it.  
In relation to Chandra T. Mohanty’s claim that essentialist thinking victimizes 
women and fails to understand fundamental cultural differences, the concept 
of seriality seems to be rather neutral. This neutrality, I would argue, is maybe 
one of its strongest features. It does not directly suppose any attributes or 
characteristics to be female, but is instead an empty concept that has to be filled 
by the empirical reality. Though Young claims that all people who identify as 
women somehow belong to the series ‘women’, the groups of women that 
emanate from this series “are usually more socially, historically, and culturally 
specified than simply women” (210). Political groups often arise from more 
specific, local problems and are therefore not merely built on the obstacles of 
gendered life but also situated around religious, financial or ideological 
conflicts. As far as I can tell, there is nothing victimizing about Young’s use of 
the concept of seriality. The concept is merely supposed to describe the 
circumstantial background that makes up the material reality of women’s lives. 
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Only when these circumstances are politically activated (in the formation of 
groups) is it possible to speak of victims and oppressors. If, for instance, a 
gendered object such as a bra is seen to be a sign of oppression to some women 
who might feel pressured into wearing it in order to conform to a sexist beauty 
standard, the series of people who wear bras might choose to mobilize. This 
turns them into a group: for example, a group with a political agenda who 
perform political actions like publically burning bras in the fight against 
unrealistic body images. In this case, bra-wearing women will be the victims of 
an oppressive patriarchy that tells them how they ought to look. But until the 
bra has been politicized, it is just an everyday object that connects the people 
who wear it through a set of experiences (e.g. a feeling of discomfort or the 
experience of having to pay 50 dollars for a piece of underwear). 
Butler criticized the normalizing tendency of proclaiming a female essence as 
the center of a female social collective.4 Again, this appears to be something that 
Young sees as inevitable. Much like Butler, Young describes how 
heterosexuality and heteronormativity shape the lives of women and men 
differently, but where Butler’s response is theoretical, (deconstructing 
gendered stereotypes and categories into scientific and social discourses) 
Young’s response is more practical. All structures are normative and 
normalizing in some way or another, but it is only ‘when the bus breaks down’ 
that this becomes a problem for us (which arguably happens more frequently 
for people belonging to female series than most male ones). Until this point is 
reached, the categories are nothing more than constructed facts, shaping 
reality. 
 
Critique of Young’s theory of seriality 
Several problems arise in accepting seriality as a way of conceptualizing 
women as a social collective, but I will only mention one, which is especially 
relevant to this analysis, given that it has to do with the problem of essentialism. 
 
4 To sum up Butler’s critique, her central point is that any essentialized notion of the gender 
identity ‘woman’ will have a normalizing effect, which means that it will 1) devalue 
alternative gender identities by presenting one interpretation of ‘woman’ as normal and 2) it 
hides the fact that gender is constructed by presenting some genders as ‘natural.’ 
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The question was briefly touched upon in the previous section and can be 
phrased as follows: Does the theory of seriality shift the focus from assuming 
the existence of a shared female identity to essentializing feminine objects? 
Young repeatedly rejects the idea that women have something in common on 
account of their similar biology or some sort of typical feminine way of 
behaving or thinking, but she seemingly finds it unproblematic to characterize 
certain objects as being feminine. But how do we define which material objects 
are relevant to feminist politics? Is it birth control pills, tampons and fashion 
items? Why not chainsaws, footballs and beer? One has to ask oneself: what 
makes these objects particularly feminine if not their relation to a gendered 
body? Does Young not have to assume a stereotypical essence of femininity 
that is represented though these objects? If so, what we have is a vicious circle 
because a conception of ‘women’ is needed prior to defining the objects that 
can be characterized as female. But those objects were supposed to be the basis 
on which the category of ‘women’ was to be established. This seems to me to 
be a mere displacement of the problem of essentialism. 
On another note, one of the main political problems of essentialism was the risk 
of leaving someone out of the social collective who considers herself a woman. 
Is this problem solved by thinking of women as a seriality? I would say, not 
really. The openness of the idea of seriality makes it possible to imagine that no 
one is left out, that everyone who considers themselves women to some degree 
take part in at least one series that could be characterized as female (no matter 
how this is to be defined). But what use is this concept if it is not limited in any 
way at all? It is far more probable that many people who do not consider 
themselves to be women find themselves belonging to a series that is 
stereotypically ‘feminine’. Cosmetics, for instance, are to Young objects that 
serialize people as women, but surely she would not think that anyone wearing 
makeup necessarily belongs to the social collective ‘women’. The concept of 
seriality seems to only positively define who could belong to the category 
‘women’ without ever saying how this category is limited. The concept does 
not only struggle with the theoretical issue of not being able to avoid 
essentialism, it is also hard to see the practical application of a collective that 
seems to have no borders.  
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Conclusion 
I have set out to examine a postmodern way of conceptualizing the social 
collective of women, which provides the foundation for feminist politics, in the 
hopes of finding a theory that maintains the practical applicability and 
organizational strength of traditional, essentialist identity politics. This means 
a theory that does not define women as possessing a specific set of attributes or 
qualities, but which can still be used to fight for women’s shared interests, 
assuming that there are any. Iris Marion Young revitalized the concept of 
seriality originally presented by Sartre as a means to talk about women as a 
social collective. The series is, in short, an impersonal, contingent connection 
between a collective of people gathered around a material object or structure. 
This material object or structure does not define the members of the series as 
individuals, but rather points to an anonymous side of them that they share 
with the other members of the series. The series can evolve into a group in the 
event that some common goal is established. The point of thinking about 
women as a series is to try to define the passive collective of people that 
feminist politics refers to when they fight for women’s interests. The materiality 
that ties women together in a series is the existence of gendered objects and 
structures. This means that belonging to the category ‘woman’ no longer relies 
on a set of attributes or qualities that each person in that category shares. Even 
though this de-essentializes the individuals belonging to a series, it seems 
merely to replace the essentialized woman with essentialized feminine objects 
that are ultimately determined by their connection to some pre-existing notion 
of ‘woman’. The question then arises: what makes these objects inherently 
feminine if not the idea of a female essence?  
To conclude, even though the theory has successfully avoided ascribing any 
specific attributes or characteristics to individuals who see themselves as 
female, it still relies on the assertion of such attributes or definitions in the 
sphere of material objects in order to establish a social collective. For Young, 
the material objects or materialized structures would have to be collectively 
determined as female for feminist groups to form around them. In my view, 
this means that this approach has not successfully solved the problem of 
essentialism, as it allows for, or even necessitates, the reproduction of standard 
notions of femininity. 
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